331.2520943 / R452 2018

Reversing Pension Privatizations: rebuilding public pension systems in Eastern Europe and Latin America / ed. Isabel Ortiz, Fabio Durán-Valverde, Stefan Urban, Veronika Wodsak. -- Geneve: Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT), 2018. xxviii, 338 p. : il.; 28 cm.

Bibliografía al final de cada capítulo.

Part 1: Reversing Pension Privatizations: rebuilding public pension systems in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Pension privatization: Three decades of failure. The privatization Experiment. Lessons learnt from three decades of pension privatization. Coverage rates stagnated or decreased. Pension benefits deteriorated. Gender and income inequality increased. High transition costs created large fiscal pressures. High administrative costs. Weak governance: Capture of regulation and supervision function. concentration of the private insurance industry. Who benefitted from people’s pension savings? The financial sector. Limited effect on capital markets in developing countries. Financial market and demographic risks transferred to individuals. Deteriorated social dialogue. Reversing pension privatizations. Timing of the re-reforms. Laws enacted. Basic characteristics of the new public model. New rights and entitlements. Re-establishing or creating a public pension administrator. Transfer of members and funds and recognition of past entitlement. Financing mechanisms: New contribution rates. Including re-introducing employers’ contributions. Contribution collection and fund management. How to reverse pension privatization: Policy steps. Part 2: Cases Studies. 1. Argentina. Summary of reforms related to pension privatization and its reversal. The variable path of pension reforms in Argentina. 1 The evolution of the pension system prior to the 1993 structural reform: from collective capitalization funds to a PAYG scheme. The structural reform of the 1990s: the mixed scheme. The re-reform of the 2000s: the new role of government. Impact of the re-reform on coverage, pension adequacy and sustainability. Coverage extension through wide-ranging but short-term policies: the moratoriums. Restoring the benefit replacement rate: from discretionary to institutional benefit adjustments. Financial sustainability: improvements in the short-term financial position, but long-term sustainability remains a challenge. Final remarks on the politics of recent reforms and challenges ahead. 2. Bolivia. Why the government re-reformed pensions and abandoned privatization. Privatization model. The main justifications/arguments for the 1996 pension privatization did not occur. Policies of the pension re-reform. A new model. Institutional arrangements. Entitlements and right. Mechanisms to improve solidarity. Fund and new investment framework. Governance, instruments for social dialogue and tripartite participation. The political economy of the re-reform. Follow-up and potential replication in other countries. Coverage of the labour force and the elderly. Gender equality. Benefit adequacy and replacement rates. Administrative costs and contributions. Fund, capital return and portfolio composition. Financial-actuarial sustainability. Macroeconomic impact. 3. Hungary. The Hungarian pension system in transition. The government decision to move away from individual accounts and the mandatory second-pension pillar. The re-reform of the pension system in 2011.The process of re-nationalizing private pensions. The new national public pension system. The impact of the 2011 re-reforms. 4. Kazakhstan. Pension system in transition. Pension system before 2013. The 2013 reform: Key characteristics, How was it done?, Major impacts. 5. Poland. The Polish pension reform of 1998 – objectives, expectations and results. Promoting later retirement without increasing statutory retirement age. Shifting from implicit to explicit pension debt in an ageing society. Promoting voluntary pension savings. Promoting competition. Reasons for re-reform and reversal of privatization. Other arguments for re-reform: Mixed assessment of the performance in terms of the investment portfolio and administrative charges, and high vulnerability to economic shocks. Progressive adjustment of the regulatory framework and concentration of pension funds. 5.3.3 Low future benefits, regardless of the financing method. Regulations regarding minimum benefits. The schedule and politics of the re-reform. The Polish pension system following the 2013 re-reform. 6. Ecuador. The reversal of pension privatization in Ecuador / Franciso Peña Jarrin. 7. Nicaragua. related to pension privatization and its reversal. Repeal of the privatization of the pension system in Nicaragua. Background on the implementation of private pension fund administrators (AFP). Initial efforts to privatize the pension system: proposals for reform and the report of the International Technical Commission. Characteristics of the desired pension model. Legal analysis of the reform. Repeal of the law: rapid return to the public system. The Nicaraguan experience. 8. Venezuela. The privatization reform. The reversal of pension privatization. Measures adopted after the re-reform. 9. Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia , Latvia , Macedonia , Romania , Slovakia. A snapshot of CEE pension schemes. Second-pillar benefits – the legal frameworks. Second-pillar benefits – three design issues. Will payments be guaranteed for life?. Will second-pillar pensions retain purchasing power?. Will second-pillar pension calculations provide gender equality?. Discussion. Appendix A. Country profiles. Appendix B. Notes on second-pillar replacement levels.

9789221322429 9789221322436 (web)


Pensiones a la vejez--Unión Europea
Seguridad Social


Durán Valverde, Fabio, (1960-)


https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/RessourcePDF.action?ressource.ressourceId=55301
Disponible sólo PDF 2101